

principle, it appears to me that, with respect to the expression of opinion as to what is, tolerance is right and intolerance wrong ; but with respect to advocacy of action that appears to be inimical to the community, intolerance is right and tolerance is wrong" (p. 258). Of course, "right" and "wrong" must be interpreted biologically. "All difference of opinion is, as has been shown, incipiently disintegratory" (p. 260). Consequently, conduct based on such difference must be seriously considered by the "community" as a whole. "However much we may deplore the suppression of the researches of Roger Bacon, of Bruno, of Galileo, and of many another pioneer and martyr of Science, we cannot but recognise that scientific research is harmless in highly-organised communities only ; and that the first necessity for a community is its own preservation" (p. 260). But if this is so, why do we "deplore" anything that is essential to the preservation of a "community" ? The implication of the argument is that the community ought to be preserved. This argument would justify as of survival value every crime committed against freedom of thought by every so-called "community" in history. The fault in the argument seems to me to lie in the uncriticised use of abstractions like "community" and "difference" of "opinion". Among those familiar with the administrative mechanisms of a "community," the community as a whole is not so much a fact as a regulative idea and its content depends largely on the concrete problem to be solved. And difference of opinion is, for the most part, differentiation of opinion—the normal method of intellectual growth, and it involves integration as well as disintegration.

Many other disputable points emerge in Dr. Mercier's book ; but enough has been said to indicate the general standpoint and the drift of the argument.

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Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit : Untersuchungen zum realistischen Wahrheitsproblem. By Dr. ALOYS MÜLLER. Bonn : M. & E. Weber. Pp. 64.

THIS little book is an attempt to work out more fully the distinction between truth and faithfulness to reality (*Wirklichkeitstreue*) which Dr. Muller introduced with a promise of further treatment in an appendix to his work, *Das Raumproblem*. Either I am very dense or it is written in such careless phraseology as to make parts of it excessively difficult to criticise.

It begins straightforwardly enough by postulating what the author calls '*Idealrealismus*'. This assumes that there are two sorts of absolute realities, psychical and non-psychical, and that their interaction produces for each man his phenomenal reality. This

phenomenal reality may be called a representation¹ (*Abbild*) of the transcendent reality, in the sense that the two are correlated. We may note at the outset what Dr. Müller does not mention that, with this definition, the transcendent reality is as much a representation of the phenomenal reality as conversely, since if A is correlated with B, B is correlated with A. Dr. Müller calls the phenomenal reality a synthesis of objective and subjective factors. At this point the confusions which I seem to find begin. He says that a representation is always a synthesis because the qualities of the original which is represented and of the reality on which it is represented melt together in the representation. This passage contains two obscurities. In the first place the phrase 'to be represented on something' (*abgebildet auf*) is introduced with no explanation. 'On' is of course a metaphor; the metaphor in question is quite familiar and intelligible in mathematics when we can talk of representing points of space, for instance, in the number system by giving co-ordinates to them; but what does the metaphor mean here? Is the transcendent reality represented 'in' or 'on' the mind? If so, since the mind is part of the transcendent reality, the latter is represented on a part of itself. There is no objection to this; the system of integers can be represented in itself by correlating them with the even integers; but surely we might have been told precisely what the author means. What I take to be the real meaning of the passage is as follows. Each man's phenomenal reality is of course a representation in the author's sense both of his soul and of non-subjective factors (including possibly other souls) in the transcendent reality. But you may also call it (or at anyrate a part of it) a representation of the non-subjective part of the transcendent reality on his own soul. Here 'on' has simply the meaning that the phenomenal reality partly depends on the nature of his own soul.

I do not feel sure that this is a fair interpretation of Dr. Müller, and I pass to the second obscurity in the passage quoted above. The word synthesis and the statement that the qualities of the original and of that on which it is represented are melted together in the representation both suggest that the mind and the non-subjective reality are in some sense contained substantially in the phenomenal reality with their separate qualities in abeyance as is supposed to be the case with the elements of a chemical compound. I see no reason to suppose that this is true, and anyhow it is obvious that it is not implied by the mere fact of representation defined as correlation. Yet Dr. Müller seems to think that it is implied in this.

The author now defends the theory of *Idealrealismus* against

¹ No doubt the proper translation of *Abbild* as a technical term of mathematics is 'transformation'. But it might lead to misunderstandings to call phenomenal reality a transformation of transcendent reality, because of the non-technical sense of 'transformation'.

Realists who are supposed to object that, since truth means agreement of idea with object, and since we have *e.g.* presentations of colours and the notion of causality, therefore there must be colours and causality (and not merely correlates to them) in the transcendent reality. If any realist is so silly as to make this objection he is conclusively answered by Dr. Müller, who points out that only judgments can be true and not presentations, and asserts that the agreement involved in truth is the agreement of the content of a judgment with its object. What the supposed realist has done is to confuse Truth, which is a predicate of judgments alone, with Faithfulness to Reality, which is a quality of representations and as such may be a quality of objects either of sense or of thought. He has also used the definition of truth as a criterion of the truth of a particular theory of knowledge. This, Dr. Müller says, is very inconsistent, because the realist admits that, as a rule, you have to find out whether a particular judgment is true by criteria other than the definition of truth, and only wants to 'take the high priori road' in the case of the objects of presentations. I agree with Dr. Müller's conclusions here, but I am sceptical about the supposed realist who is refuted. The objection that he makes to *Idealrealismus* is so absurd that it is scarcely possible to state it even plausibly. It is strange, by-the-by, that Dr. Müller's realists always regard the soul as a mirror and are justly blamed for doing so; it never seems to have struck them that the soul might directly cognise transcendent reality.

I cannot agree with Dr. Müller that the definition of truth can *never* be used as a criterion of any particular theory. If truth means agreement and some one produces a theory that rests on the view that truth is coherence it is surely open to us to criticise his theory because we disagree with his notion of truth.

The rest of the book is devoted to an analysis of faithfulness and its relations to truth. Here, too, there is much that I (at any rate) find obscure. We are told that colours, for example, are themselves syntheses of phenomenal factors of the second order. On the objective side these include ether waves. Hence colours can be said to have 'phenomenal faithfulness,' for they are representations of ether waves and other factors which are themselves phenomenal. But these factors of the second order are themselves syntheses of factors of the first order. This is plain enough, though of very doubtful validity. I cannot see in what sense an ether wave is a phenomenon. It never appears to any one and never can do so. Surely then it is either a piece of transcendent reality or nothing at all.

But now there comes a passage which I cannot follow. We are told that the world of everyday and the world of physics both have phenomenal faithfulness and are both syntheses of factors of the *second* order. But surely ether waves belong to the physical world, and we learnt that they were syntheses of factors of the *first* order. Nor do I see quite what is meant by saying that the physical world

has phenomenal faithfulness. I suppose, however, that the author means that ether waves are as much representations of colours as are colours of ether waves. If this is what is meant we must grant that the transcendent reality has phenomenal faithfulness too.

In § 12 there are some very odd remarks about invariance. If A is a representation of B, that which A and B have in common is called an invariant for the transformation. Now the degree of faithfulness depends in any given case on the range of invariance, and the measure of this is the biological one of fitness in the representation to support and develop life. To this I can only reply that I think the author must be confusing community with closeness of correlation. There can never be much *in common* to phenomenal and transcendent reality, and I see no reason to suppose that there is more community as the faithfulness of the representation increases. But increased faithfulness does mean greater closeness of correlation in the sense that the relation between original and representation approaches nearer to a one-one relation.

In § 15 there is another mass of difficulties. Faithfulness can belong to what Dr. Müller calls '*Urteilsbilder*'. Since these include the world of physics I suppose they are objects that can only be known by descriptions. The objects of such judgments are 'relations in a representation'. These representations may be *contents* of presentations or judgments. Hence presumably they are psychical, for he says that he uses 'content' in Meinong's sense; and he certainly said that the content of a judgment was the affirmation or negation of the existence of its object. Now he gives as an example of the judgments that he has in mind, 'This table is round'. I cannot see that the object of this judgment is a relation in a synthesis of affirmations or negations or of anything psychical. But perhaps it is only meant that the representations in question *may* but *need* not be psychical in character. But then, after telling us that the object of a judgment is a *relation in a synthesis*, he adds that the object is a *synthesis* with maximum invariance of faithfulness. I really do not see how it can be both a relation in a synthesis and a synthesis.

It is useless for me to labour through the whole book, since it is evident that it is either hopelessly confused or wholly beyond my intelligence. I will therefore merely add that it contains a chapter on the Value-theory of Truth and appendices on the possibility of different systems of truth and on the character of the Laws of Logic. I have tried to be fair to the author, and if I have failed (as is not unlikely) it is from no lack of goodwill.

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